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Over the past few decades, the liberalization in international trade has progressed at rapid 
speed. Many traditional forms of barriers to trade, most importantly tariffs and quotas, 
have been reduced worldwide. Accompanying this great reduction in trade barriers has 
also been a great expansion in trade. Trade to GDP ratio has increased 86.1 percent from 
1950 to 1990, and a large proportion is likely to be accounted by the reduction in trade 
barriers. (Bergoeing and Kehoe 2003).  While tariffs and quotas have been and continue 
to be reduced, another type of trade barrier, antidumping, is being used more and more 
frequently as a measure of protection. (Prusa and Skeath, 2002).  Further complicating 
the role of antidumping is the fact that the economies who are being affected by 
antidumping protection has changed over time; traditionally antidumping was used by 
and against developed economies, but over the past decade developing economies have 
emerged as frequent targets (and users) of antidumping (Prusa, 2001; Fu, 1997).  
 
In this paper, we focus on the case of China, to explore the characteristics, the reasons for 
and implications of antidumping. China initiated trade liberalization about 25 years ago, 
and since has observed an accelerated increase in exports. Coincidental with its increased 
exports, China has also become the largest targeting economy of antidumping (AD) trade 
disputes. There are many aspects of AD that explain why China is more susceptible to 
  - 1 - antidumping, including its non-market economy (NME) status. Yet, as suggested by 
Blonigen (2003), even after controlling for all these unfavorable factors, China is subject 
to an inexplicably large number of antidumping attacks.   
 
The literature on antidumping against China includes several articles that review the use 
of AD by EU (Vermulst and Graafsma, 1992; Liu and Vandenbussche, 2002; Mai, 2002; 
Eeckhout, 1997; Wang, 1999), and two that examine the US AD cases (McGee, 1999; 
Kao, 1990). A recent working paper by Messerlin (2002) also discusses the 
characteristics of AD activity against China.  
 
Our paper builds on the previous studies, and make new contributions in analyzing the 
reasons for China being so broadly and intensively targeted. In particular, the domestic 
characteristics of exports structure and industrial structures are examined.  Our analysis 
also reveals that foreign direct investment (FDI) may be a significant factor explaining 
AD cases against China.  There is also evidence that low concentration ratios in Chinese 
industries have contributed to the competitive price and low profit margins.  
 
The next section discusses the characteristics of AD cases targeting Chinese imports.  We 
then analyze the reasons for AD activity against China and discuss some implications for 
the Chinese economy. We make a few concluding comments in the final section.  
 
 
  - 2 - 2.  Characteristics of AD Cases Against China 
 
We would like to establish a set of stylized facts about AD targeting China, focusing on 
the size, trend, intensity, and broadness.  
 
A.  The size and the trend 
 
As it is well known, China is the largest target economy for AD cases. The total number 
of AD cases targeting China reached 457 by the end of 2001, making China’s total only 
slightly lower that all of the EU economies combined.  If current trends continue, China 
will surpass the EU in the near future. China is easily the largest target when compared 
with any individual economy.  
 
In Table 1, we present the time series since 1980 of the top six economies affected by AD 
investigations. The US was the top target economy during the early 1980s; it was then 
replaced by Japan who remained the most targeted economy during the rest of the 1980s. 
Since 1992, China has been the top targeted economy every year. Not only is it the 
largest affected economy, but also the number of cases against China easily surpasses the 
level of the US and Japan when they were the leading targets. Overall even though China 
only become a significant target in the past ten years, its total number of AD cases has 
surpassed the US and Japan, and China has emerged as the largest targeted economy.  
 
Not only is the number of AD cases targeting China high, but also the trend is positive 
and increasing at a rapid rate. The number of cases against China was relatively small in 
  - 3 - the early to mid 1980s; since 1988, however, there has been a marked increase in the 
number of cases against China by both the EU and the US (Vermulst and Graafsma, 
1992).  
 
In order to quantify this trend in AD filings we have applied a simple fixed effect OLS 
model:  
nit = ai + b ×  t + bi ×  t 
where         
        nit = number of cases filed against economy i at time t  (e.g., each year) 
        ai = economy fixed effect  
        bi = economy-specific trend 
        t  = time trend 
 
In table 2 we report our estimates.  Note that our regression includes an time dummy for 
each economy; however, for space reasons we only report the parameters for the nine 
economies with statistically significant estimates.  As shown it turns out, the time trend 
for most economies is insignificant; in addition, most economies with significant 
estimates have negative trends.  There are only four economies showing positive trends: 
China, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand. The time trend for China is the steepest of all 
target economies.  As can be seen in Figure 1, the other three economies with a positive 
coefficient have much milder slope in comparison with China.  Moreover, as we will 
discuss later (Table 6) it is developing economies such as India and Mexico that are main 
contributors to the steep upward trend.  Therefore, in the foreseeable future, China is 
  - 4 - likely to stay as the most named economy in AD filings and is going to see continuing 
increase in the share of total AD filings.   
 
B. The  intensity 
 
Because of China’s growing international trade and growing size of the economy, it is 
perhaps not surprising to see it being named frequently in AD filings.  After all, more 
trade may simply lead to more filings against it.  The next question to ask, then, is 
whether China is also being named more intensively than other economies given its trade 
value. The answer is positive.  
 
The intensity of AD against China is high. As we have already shown China is the 
leading AD target.  In terms of international trade, China ranks as the sixth largest in the 
world both in terms of exports and imports.  This disparity suggests the intensity of AD 
use against China is high.  To quantify this point we compute three indicators for 
intensity of being targeted for AD (see Table 3).  The first is the “AD-export” ratio, 
which is defined as an economy’s share of AD cases in the world divided by its share in 
world exports.  If an economy’s AD-export ratio is above 1, it means that the economy is 
being targeted more than its share in exports.   
 
Consider China’s intensity number.  China accounts for about 4.3 percent of total world 
exports in 2001, and an astounding 17 percent of all AD cases (1995-2002).  Therefore, 
according to this measure China receives four times as much as AD investigations as one 
  - 5 - might predict given its share in world exports (AD-export ratio = 4).  Korea, Indonesia, 
India and South Africa are also among the other high AD-export ratio economies.  
 
A second indicator is an economy’s affirmative ratio, which is defined as the number of 
measures (i.e., duties levied) divided by the number of initiations targeting a particular 
economy. During the period of 1995-2002, 69 percent of all AD initiations against China 
received an affirmative final determination. While this number is high, there are several 
other economies that have even higher ratios, such as Japan, Russia, Brazil, Ukraine, and 
Singapore.  
 
Our third intensity measure combines the first two in order to indicate the overall 
possibility of an economy’s exports being subject to AD duties.  This third measure is 
reported in the final column where we calculate the product of the first two measures.  
With this third measure, China ranks 3
rd, trailing Ukraine and India.  However, one needs 
to remember that the total number of cases against India and Ukraine combined is only 
40 percent of the total against China.  In this sense, China exports bear the most 
significant brunt of AD protection.   
 
One important caveat: one must recognize that all of the above three measures offer only 
crude estimates of AD intensity.  There are a number of weaknesses in these measures, 
not the least is that none of them accurately measure the amount of trade being affected in 
any given case.   
 
  - 6 - C.  The AD measures 
 
The duties resulting from the final determination can be very high in AD cases against 
China. In many cases, the measures are prohibitive. For instance, Liu and Vandenbussche 
(2002) and Fu (1997) examine EU AD against China.  The two studies look at different 
time periods but both find that the AD duties imposed by the EU are high.  Liu and 
Vandenbussche (2002) report the average antidumping duty (ADD) is around 41 percent, 
ranging from 10 to 102 percent. Fu (1997) examines the trade impact of the duties and 
finds dramatic decreases in trade.  For instance, after the EU imposed AD measures on 
Chinese exports of Tungstic Oxide and Tungstic Acid, and Barium Chloride in 1988, the 
exports of these products from China to the EU dropped by 96 percent in four years.  
Similarly, exports of small color televisions, polyester yarns and videotapes in cassettes 
dropped over 90 percent.   
 
We have compiled antidumping duty (ADD) data for the US against Chinese exports; our 
result indicates even higher ADD than observed by the EU against Chinese exports. 
Among the 60 AD cases for which we have information on ADD, 11 had ADD above 
100 percent, and 6 of them the ADD is above 150 percent; 17 cases had ADD duties 
between 50 and 100 percent.  Altogether, nearly half of US cases against China had ADD 
above 50 percent.  The average ADD is 54 percent 
 
The AD duties from the developing economies (what are often referred to as the new 
users) tend to be even higher than those applied by the EU and US.  For example, Brazil 
  - 7 - currently has ADD imposed on 12 types of Chinese products, with margins ranging from 
35.8 percent to 203.4 percent, with an average around 77 percent.  
 
D.  The sectors being named 
 
We also investigate the type of Chinese products that are targeted by AD investigations. 
Our results indicate that the range of industries that have been the targets for AD is 
amazingly wide. In terms of two-digit ISIC classification of industries, all 2-digit 
manufacturing industries have been targeted (Table 4). In terms of three-digit ISIC 
classification, 26 out of total 29 (3-digit) ISIC manufacturing industries. Such widespread 
coverage not only demonstrates China’s diverse economy and widespread comparative 
advantage, but it also demonstrates how comprehensive and versatile tool antidumping 
can be, allowing an economy to protect virtually any filing industry, regardless whether 
the industry has comparative advantage.  
 
Despite the breadth of Chinese industries being targeted, the frequencies for some 
industries are particularly high. Four sectors account for 80 percent of all AD filings: 
“Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastic 
Products”, “ Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment”, 
“Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industries”, and “Basic Metal Industries”.  The 
first two sectors account for 55 percent of all AD filings. The filing trends suggest that 
the simple basic manufacturing industries which China has its greatest cost advantages 
are also the ones being hit the hardest by AD.  
 
  - 8 - The most frequently targeted industries at the four-digit classification level are 
“Manufacture of basic industrial chemicals except fertilizers” and “Iron and steel basic 
industries”, which together account for 25 percent of all filings. Activity against the other 
4-digit sectors are fairly evenly spread out, with 19 sectors having been subject to 9 to 23 
cases, and 37 sectors named from once to six times (Table 5).  
 
E.  The filing economies 
 
The next issue we examine is the question of who is targeting Chinese exports. We find 
that China has been targeted by a wide array of economies. Treating all EU members as 
one economy, there have been 25 economies that have launched AD investigation against 
Chinese exports.  
 
Among the top initiators are: US, EU, India, Australia, Argentina, and Mexico; together 
they account for 72 percent of all AD cases filing against China. AD activity, therefore, is 
concentrated among a handful of major users.  In order to examine whether there are 
significant differences in the filing intensity we computed each economy’s filing intensity 
and relative filing intensity as:  
 
 Intensityi   = Number of filings against Chinai / Imports from Chinai 
 Relative  Intensityi   = Intensityi / IntensityUS 
 
As shown in Table 6, South Korea, the US and EU are among the least intensive 
economies using AD to target Chinese exports. Developed economies with high 
  - 9 - intensities are Australia and New Zealand, which are 8.4 and 11.5 times more likely to 
file an AD case relative to the US.  The truly large users are developing economies such 
as Argentina (relative intensity=46.8), Peru (42.4), India (18.1) and Mexico (15).  Not 
surprisingly, these economies all compete in labor-intensive industries that are most 
likely losing (or have lost) comparative advantage in those industries to China.  
 
In summary, with respect to AD investigations targeting China we have shown that: 
1.  China constitutes the largest single economy being targeted by AD investigations; 
2.  The trend in using AD against China is positive and is growing faster than any 
other economy; 
3.  The intensity which Chinese exports are targeted is high; the likelihood that ADD 
are imposed is high; 
4.  When they are imposed, AD duties are very high, often prohibitive; 
5.  The sectors covered is broad, nearly comprehensive; 
6.  A large number of developing and developed economies target Chinese exports; 
filing intensities varies widely across filings economies. 
 
While in some respects China is not unique as many developing economies have broadly 
similar stories of AD abuse, especially in terms of the high intensity and high likelihood 
of duties being levied.  Taking all factors together, however, China clearly emerges as the 
economy most severely affected by AD.  
 
  - 10 - 3.  The Reasons for High China’s AD Intensity and High AD Duties 
 
In this section, we investigate the reasons for the large number and high intensity of AD 
investigations targeting China, as well as the high AD duties in AD cases against China.  
 
First we document the likely contributing factors that are shared with other economies, 
such as the strategic use of AD, NME status, the role of cumulation, and inexperienced 
and ineffective legal defenses. We then focus on a couple of factors that are very unique 
in China, the roles played foreign direct investment (FDI) through foreign invested 
enterprises (FEI) and the low concentration ratio in many Chinese industries.  
 
A.  AD as a learned strategy for domestic firms blocking foreign competition 
 
To what extent is AD a learned strategic behavior?  How can we account the proliferation 
of AD across industries and across economies?  Prusa and Skeath (2002) and Fu (1997) 
argue that it is likely that firms learn that AD can be used strategically to block foreign 
competition.  In the case of China, because of its rapid increase in trade, the publicity 
about China is abundant.  Publicity about China lowers the cost of acquiring information 
needed in the AD petition. We have examined the possibility of copying from the same 
industries across economies in launching AD investigations as an indication of an 
informational spillover.  A simple measure is to check how many antidumping cases for 
the similar products occur within one year of one other in different economies (e.g., 
similar case against Chinese exports by both EU and US within one year).  If a case is 
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“echoes” the initial filing.  
 
We find that there have been 83 cases against China that could be said to echo.  That is, 
these cases were initiated within one year of another economy initiating an AD case 
involving the same or very similar products.  Cases involving textiles and footwear 
frequently echoed.  For example, in the case of textiles, EU, Mexico, Turkey and Peru 
each launched AD investigations on a wide array of textile products within a short time 
frame. 
 
We believe our measure is conservative in two senses.  First, we restrict our measure to 
only one year, however, a span of 18 month or longer could be reasonably called an 
echoing period. Moreover, the learning could occur across wide array of products 
(echoing within an economy rather than between economies).  For example, Mexico had 
AD investigations covering HS codes 52, 53, 54 and 55, and Peru had investigations 
covering “various fabrics”.  Simply put, it seems likely that the learning occur across 
industries, which is a type of learning that our measure does not capture.  
 
Can AD initiation be a learned tactic for declining industries? This seems to be a very 
logical tactic for some industries. It is fairly commonly observed that AD investigations 
involved the same (or similar) line of products are filed repeatedly over time.  Steel is 
perhaps the best example where both the US and EU have filed AD investigations 
involving many types of Chinese steel over the past decade.  Australia launched 
  - 12 - investigation on canned pear and peaches, and soon thereafter started investigation on 
canned tomatoes.  In EU, the AD investigation against Chinese made cotton fabrics was 
initiated three times in 1994, 1996 and 1997.  
 
Therefore, it seems that AD protection can be contagious across economies and becomes 
a learned behavior over time.  If an AD action against foreign competitor can achieve an 
affirmative result with a high probability, or if it deters the imports through litigation 
costs, then AD is more likely to become a learned behavior. Unfortunately, this seems to 
be the case.  According to various studies (Prusa and Skeath 2002, Fu 1997), AD 
investigations have successfully deterred imports and raised profitability of initiating 
firms, therefore, the economic rational for troubled firms to initiate AD is very strong.  
 
B.  Non-market economy (NME) status 
 
There are a few widely recognized reasons that Chinese exports receive disproportional 
amount of AD investigations. China’s non-market economy status is arguably the most 
commonly cited explanation.  
 
The GATT/WTO antidumping rules allow an investigating economy to not use the 
exporter’s domestic prices when calculating the home market sales, input costs, etc.  
Being classified as a non-market makes it extremely difficult (virtually impossible) for 
exporting economy to defend itself.  China has always been classified as a non-market 
  - 13 - economy.  In the accession protocol to WTO, China agreed that this non-market 
treatment would not be phased out for another 15 years (will expire in 2016).   
 
The argument is that China is not considered a market economy; thus Chinese domestic 
prices do not reflect the true cost of these inputs as determined in the markets. Therefore, 
during the investigation of antidumping case targeting China, the investigators do not 
have to use the Chinese domestic input prices in determining the cost of the production of 
the investigated product.  
 
This practice renders greatly increases China’s risk in dumping allegations because the 
low cost of labor services is its major comparative advantage for international trade. In 
practice, China’s non-market economy status hands greater discretionary power to the 
investigators, who have the option to choose an economy with high prices when 
evaluating the cost of inputs in China.  For example, in a recent investigation in brake 
rotors by the US, the handling and freight cost was calculated using India cost. India is 
known for higher cost of transportation than most of its neighbors.
1 Therefore, using 
India price would increase the likelihood of affirmative result.   
 
Even though non-market status contributed to unfavorable determination in AD 
investigations against China, it is probably not sufficient to explain the large number of 
cases targeting China (Blonigen, 2003).  Even after controlling for China’s non-market 
                                                 
1 [Federal Register: January 8, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 5)][Page 1031-1038]  [DOCID:fr08ja03-24] [A-
570-846]  Brake Rotors from the People's Republic of China: Preliminary, Results and Preliminary Partial 
Rescission of the Fifth Antidumping, Duty Administrative Review and Preliminary Results of the Seventh 
New Shipper Review. 
  - 14 - status, Blonigen still finds a significantly positive unexplained “China factor”. Therefore, 
there are other factors that are not yet well captured or measured by economists that 




Cumulation is another factor that increases the number of cases against China.  As is well 
known, China has experienced a rapid expansion of the international trade. Its share of 
world trade has increased seven-fold and China’s volume of international trade increased 
40-fold during 1977-2001.
2  With the rapid growth of international trade, it is inevitable 
that the China’s import market share in a particular economy will rise rapidly from non-
existent or very small to above the low threshold for cumulation. Therefore, even though 
Chinese imports in many products still capture only a small proportion of the market, 
with the cumulative assessment of the market share, China is included in the investigation 
even though China is not (at the time of the filing of the case) a significant exporter to 
foreign markets.  Hansen and Prusa (1996) document that the mandatory cumulation in 
1984 in the US has led to significant increase in the possibility of finding injuries. Since 
most AD initiations against China have occurred since the late 1980s, therefore, 
cumulation has likely contributed to the large number of cases filed against China as well 
as the intensity against China.  
 
D.  Weakness in corporate governance prevents effective defense in AD 
investigations 
                                                 
2 The data source is World Development Indicator 2003. 
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It has been noted that, especially in the first decade of facing AD investigations, Chinese 
enterprises have not coordinated well or presented their case in an effective manner.  This 
reflects the overall weakness of Chinese enterprises in terms of the backward corporate 
governance practice, and also the overall weakness of the nationwide legal infrastructure.  
 
Chinese enterprises often do not respond in a timely manner, and cannot afford high cost 
for hiring lawyers of experiences, and in some cases just not responded at all. China has a 
tradition of having a weak legal system, and Chinese traditional values do not encourage 
litigation. The SOE status is much to account for this behavior, where the managers have 
little incentive to fight for the SOE’s behalf where they personally have little stake. 
Moreover, even when some are willing to cooperate, they lack the authority as well as the 
necessary skill and information to respond effectively.  
 
On top of this, the macro coordination effort still needs improvement. One piece of 
evidence is that among all 53 cases of the WTO dispute involving antidumping issues, 
none has been filed by China.
3  In fact, China is the only one economy among the top-ten 
target economies that has not filed a single WTO dispute on AD issues.  
 
China was not eligible to file complaints to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
before it became a member in 2002.  Yet, of the approximately 200 AD cases targeting 
                                                 
3 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm#bkmk4 for list of AD 
disputes.   
  - 16 - China annually, it is unlikely that all cases are handled in conformity with WTO laws. It 
is still unclear if China will begin to lodge some complains to DSB in the near future.    
 
It remains to see whether filing complaints has any impact on the cases initiated or not.  If 
it does, as common sense would predict, then the fact that China does not use the DSB 
might lead the initiating economy over-reach in its efforts to levy ADD on cases against 
China. This issue is not a factor controlled in Blonigen’s (2003) study that found a 
significant positive “China effect” in AD activity.  Future research should examine 
whether WTO DSB has any deterrent effect on AD activity.  
 
E.  Foreign direct investment and the “antidumping (AD) triangle” 
 
Once China relaxed the regulations governing FDI in 1992 inward FDI has increased 
dramatically. Currently the foreign invested enterprises (FIE), the firms with FDI, 
account for roughly 50 percent of both Chinese imports and exports. 
 
Blonigen (2000) documented that FDI is one means for a foreign firm to avoid a tariff or 
AD duty or what he refers to as tariff-jumping.  We explore the related hypothesis that 
FDI might play an important role in explaining the large number of AD filings against 
Chinese exports. A significant amount of Chinese FDI has been from the four East-Asian 
Tigers and has resulted in Chinese-sourced exports have replaced exports from parent 
company home markets.  It is natural to hypothesize that AD filings against China are 
  - 17 - also replacing AD filings against these economies.  This is a particular type of tariff 
jumping by multinationals not previously discussed in the literature.  
 
Due to data limitation, at this time we cannot fully explore the “AD triangle” hypothesis.  
What we can do, however, is document the correlation of FDI flow into China with the 
number AD filings against China.  Our result shows that the number of AD filings against 
Chinese exports is increasing significantly in FDI. The estimating equation is: 
 
nt = a + b1 ln(FDIt) + b2 ln(Exportst) + b3 (Exchange ratet) + et ,  
 
where 
  nt = number of cases filed against China at time t (e.g., each year) 
   FDIt = inward flow FDI at time t 
  Exportst = Chinese exports at time t 
  Exchange Ratet = exchange rate (Yuan per dollar) at time t 
 
Because the dependent variable is a count variable, we use Poisson regression model. As 
can be seen in Table 8, FDI is the only significant explanatory variable, and it is 
significant at the 99 percent level. Exports are statistically insignificant and the exchange 
rate has wrong sign.
4  As shown in Figure 3, the high correlation between FDI and AD 
filings is obvious. This simple regression lends strong support for the notion that Chinese 
                                                 
4 When we test each explanatory variables individually, they are all-significant and have correct signs, but 
the FDI has the highest pseudo r-square value.  
  - 18 - FDI inflow plays an important role in the number of AD cases filed. This is also 
consistent with the proposed special type of tariff jumping, the “AD triangle”.   
 
F.  Low concentration ratio in Chinese industries 
 
One particular feature of Chinese industries is their very low concentration ratios. 
Existing studies focus on the geographic concentration, which is high (Amiti and Wen 
2002). However the market concentration is very low. Even though no much literature 
has been found on this, low concentration is a well-recognized fact, and in the Tenth 
Five-year Plan on Industrial Structure Adjustment, the fact that production concentration 
is low was recognized as one of the major problems of current industrial structure in 
China. According to the analysis in the Third Industrial Census (National Statistic Bureau 
2003), one of the major problem is “small and scattered scale of industrial organization”.  
 
A brief comparison can demonstrate the huge difference in concentration level in 
industries between China and the US. In the US, 50 largest industrial firms count for 23% 
of total production in manufacturing (in year 1997), and top 201 firms count for 60% of 
total
5. Whereas in china, 375 largest firms produce 16% of total industrial output in 2001, 
and it takes an enormous number of 22,987 firms to produce 60% of total industrial 
output
6. The difference is huge. Even though the US data is for manufacturing only and 
China data is for all industries including manufacturing, utility and mining sectors, it does 
not affect the result much. In the US, mining counts only 4% and utility counts for 9% of 
                                                 
5 Data source: 1997 Economic Census, US Census Bureau.  
6 Data source: Table 13-1, China Statistical Yearbook, 2003.   
  - 19 - industrial output, thus it can only affect slightly the overall US concentration level 
presented above
7.  Therefore, the statistics strongly indicates that Chinese industries are 
far less concentrated than that of the US.  
 
Given very low production and market concentration, profitability of Chinese firms is 
reduced. The low profit margins, when facing AD investigation, which typically specify 
high profit margin when evaluating cost of production, can lead to higher imposed duties. 
This is still only a hypothesis and need further investigation whether its impact is 
significant enough leading to quantitative impacts on AD determinations. The low profit 
margin in Chinese firms can also lead to undercutting the exports prices, which will lead 
to more AD initiations.  
 
The mirror problem of the low concentration and low profit margin in Chinese industries 
is the relatively high concentration ratio and higher profitability in many major AD 
initiating economies. In the highly concentrated industries, the firms exhibit more 
strategic behavior, and are more likely to utilize the tool of AD regulation to block the 
foreign competition. This has been confirmed by the study on EU AD (Liu and 
Vandenbussche, 2002) who document that the majority of AD files are filed by highly 
concentrated industries; in many cases monopolists and oligopolies in the EU market; a 
very small proportion (less than 15 percent) involve not so concentrated industries. This 
statistic also applies to the US, another major user of AD, where the industrial 
                                                 
7 In fact, the utility sector in the US is also very concentrated, with 4 largest firms counting 15% of total 
revenue of the sector.  The mining sector is less concentrated, but with its 4% share of total output, it will 
produce only negligible impact on overall concentration level.    Data source: 1997 Economic Census, US 
Census Bureau. 
  - 20 - concentration among industries using AD is high (Hansen and Prusa, 1996). In many 
respects, this finding illustrates one of the great ironies of AD regulation ---  instead of 
creating “fair” competition, it punishes the competitive international industries, and 





It is a difficult task to evaluate the impacts of AD on China. One reason is the lack of data, 
but another is that the dynamic impacts are yet to be fully understood. For instance, the 
US uses individual treatment, which often gives one (or a few Chinese exporters) smaller 
ADD and all other Chinese exporters, current or future, a very high ADD. In this case it 
not only alters the trade pattern, it also will affect the industrial structure in China. 
However, these effects are hard to use a formal treatment to estimate, therefore in this 
section we only discuss qualitatively some likely impacts of the large, growing, intensive, 
severe, and broad AD filings against Chinese exports.  
 
The amount of Chinese exports affected by AD, among trade remedies, is the second 
largest, only trailing technical barriers. According to Yue (2003), the cumulated amount 
of exports that have been affected has reached 16 billion US dollars. Fu (1997) estimates 
that about 5 percent of Chinese exports to EU are affected by EU AD filings.  This 
number is very large considering the strong deterring effect of AD investigation on 
imports. In comparison with tariffs, ADD are very high and target the particular products. 
  - 21 - As we have discussed in the intensity of AD from various economies, EU is modest in 
terms of intensity of filing, therefore, it is very likely in other economies, the trade 
affected will be much higher than 5 percent of total. Therefore, the amount of trade 
affected is very significant. The cost is also to employment, which will be adversely 
affected through the decrease in exports, which will further complicate China’s 
continuing economic transition.   
 
Moreover, learning from the lessons of antidumping, some Chinese manufactures have 
begun to form alliance, restricting the price of exports to the US.  For example, the apple 
cider producers in China now meet annually to determine the minimum price to the US. It 
is natural to see more and more firms become aware and begin to charge higher export 
prices toward major users of AD. This might contribute toward increasing the 
concentration ratio in Chinese industries, or even create monopolies or oligopolies in 
exports markets.   
 
Moreover, according to our finding on the role of FDI in explaining the AD filings, the 
multinationals or foreign investors are likely hurt by AD filings against Chinese exports.  
 
Will China become a new important user of AD? We think yes. The number of cases 
filed by China is increasing rapidly. We have illustrated in Figure 4 the number of cases 
initiated by China, which has a clear positive trend.  There is no evidence China has used 
AD as a retaliation toward economies filing AD against Chinese exports, however, it 
should be recognized that China has it own industries to protect, and it might find that 
  - 22 - AD can be a very convenient instrument for protection. The ongoing pressure of 
unemployment, and the fact that much needed expansion of Chinese exports sector 
employment is constrained by the foreign AD filings, it is natural for China to use the 





We have examined the case of AD filings for Chinese exports, the largest in the world, in 
this paper, and document the characteristics of these AD filings. We have shown that AD 
activity against China has involved and continues to involve a large number of filings; 
that AD use against China is increasing; that intensity of AD use against China is high; 
that Chinese cases often involve very high duty levels; that AD cases against China have 
broad industrial coverage, and have been initiated by many economies. We then analyze 
the possible causes and/or contributing factors for the use of AD against China. Besides 
common factors being recognized by other studies, such as non-market economy status 
and cumulation, we have found two important and unique contributing factors in China, 
the FDI inflow and the low concentration ratio in Chinese industries.  
 
The FDI hypothesis is related with studies on tariff jumping, yet it is different that it 
involves not investing in the AD initiating economy, which might not have comparative 
advantage. Some of the FDI inflow to China might be from foreign firms that were 
subjected to anti-dumping, either in its home economy or a third economy that it had 
  - 23 - foreign investment, to relocate to China, which has not been subjected to AD filings yet 
and which has comparative advantages in these industries. We are not able to directly test 
this hypothesis, however, our result is consistent with it. It requires multi-economy study 
to further explore the validity of this hypothesis.  
 
Our review of AD filings against China has confirmed that the AD practice can be very 
convenient and effective tool to deter trade and that it has a number of dynamic impacts 
that are hard to quantify. China is likely to follow other new users of AD if the filings 
against Chinese products continue to rise and obstruct the creation of employment in 
export sector to absorb unemployment from the dismantled industries as a result of WTO 
transition and other reforms. Should this happen, significant welfare cost will occur to 
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TAIPEI OTHER  TOTAL 
1980 1  20  .  5  .  .  43  69 
1981 1  11  5  9  1  4  62  93 
1982 8  20  17  19  .  5  148  217 
1983 8  16  12  21  .  10  106  173 
1984  6  13  9  19 2  7 95  151 
1985 8  14  12  20  1  12  135  202 
1986 6  14  11  18  .  11  100  160 
1987  1  18  8  19 1  6 66  119 
1988 5  10  12  18  .  8  69  122 
1989  4  8  6  10 1  6 61  96 
1990 12  18  11  13  3  11  97  165 
1991 16  16  12  18  16  10  140  228 
1992 31  26  25  14  19  15  190  320 
1993 45  31  17  11  21  11  161  297 
1994 44  14  8  7  37  5  119  234 
1995 20  12  14  5  9  4  92  156 
1996 43  21  11  6  11  9  123  224 
1997 33  15  15  12  17  16  135  243 
1998 28  15  24  13  21  10  136  247 
1999 41  14  34  22  29  22  187  349 
2000 43  13  22  9  18  16  157  278 
2001 53  13  19  12  13  19  211  340 
TOTAL 457  352  304  300  220  217  2633  4483 
 
 
  - 27 -  




Baseline Time Trend      0.280 
[0.143] 
(Japan)*Time  Trend      -0.498 
[0.185]** 
(Indonesia)*Time Trend     0.923 
[0.294]** 
(South Korea)*Time Trend     0.41 
[0.190]* 
(Thailand)*Time Trend     0.451 
[0.217]* 
(PRC)*Time  Trend      2.091 
[0.185]** 
(Czechoslovakia)*Time Trend   -0.847 
[0.324]** 
(Poland)*Time  Trend      -0.402 
[0.190]* 
(Romania)*Time Trend     -0.382 
[0.190]* 
(New Zealand)*Time Trend     -0.496 
[0.206]* 
Observations       806 
R-squared       0.81 
Standard errors in brackets 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Note: Only economies with statistically significant time trends reported 
 













Product of the 
two intensity 
measures 
1 China,  P.R.  308  14.3  4  69  2.76 
2 South  Korea  160  7.4  4.8  52  2.50 
3 United  States  115  5.3  0.4  58  0.23 
4 China,  Taipei  109  5  4  63  2.52 
5 Indonesia  91  4.2  4.7  43  2.02 
6 Japan  88  4.1  0.6  73  0.44 
7 India  82  3.8  5.9  54  3.19 
8 Thailand  81  3.8  3.4  59  2.01 
9 Russia  77  3.6  2.1  71  1.49 
10 Germany  70  3.2  0.3  46  0.14 
11 Brazil  68  3.1  3.5  75  2.63 
12 South  Africa  46  2.1  4.3  52  2.24 
13 Ukraine  46  2.1  7.1  83  5.89 
14 Malaysia  40  1.9  1.3  59  0.77 
15 United  Kingdom  40  1.9  0.4  58  0.23 
16 Italy  39  1.8  0.5  48  0.24 
17 Spain  37  1.7  1  59  0.59 
18 France  32  1.5  0.3  54  0.16 
19 Singapore  32  1.5  1.3  72  0.94 
20 Turkey  30  1.4  2.8  41  1.15 
Note: Chinese and Indian exports share are 95-02 average, while others using 2002 share.  The reason is 
that other economies do not exhibit significant changes in share of world trade. 





35 - Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and 
Plastic Products  158 
38 - Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment  105 
32 - Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industries  62 
37 – Basic Metal Industries  55 
36 - Manufacture of Non-Metallic Mineral Products, except Products of 
Petroleum and Coal  31 
39 - Other Manufacturing Industries  21 
31 - Manufacture of Food, Beverages and Tobacco  17 
34 - Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing  8 
33 - Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products, Including Furniture  6 
11 - Agriculture and Hunting  4 
29 - Other Mining  4 
23 - Metal Ore Mining  3 
 
 
  - 30 - Table 5. Chinese Exports Affected by AD by Four-digit ISIC Classification 
 
Rank Sector  Description  ISIC4 
No. AD 
cases 
1  Manufacture of basic industrial chemicals except 
fertilizers  3511 80 
2  Iron and steel basic industries  3710  46 
3  Manufacture of other chemical products  3522  23 
4  Manufacture of footwear, except vulcanized or 
moulded rubber or plastic footwear  3240 19 
5  Manufacturing industries not elsewhere classified  3909  19 
6  Manufacture of fabricated metal products except 
machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified 3819 18 
7  Manufacture of chemical products not elsewhere 
classified  3529 17 
8  Manufacture of textiles not elsewhere classified  3219  15 
9  Manufacture of cutlery, hand tools and general 
hardware  3811 15 
10  Canning and preserving of fruits and vegetables  3113  14 
11  Manufacture of glass and glass products  3620  14 
12  Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles  3844  14 
13  Manufacture of wearing apparel, except footwear  3220  10 
14  Manufacture of synthetic resins, plastic materials 
and man-made fibres except glass  3513 10 
15  Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products not 
elsewhere classified  3699 9 
16  Non-ferrous metal basic industries  3720 9 
17  Manufacture of fertilizers and pesticides  3512 8 
18  Manufacture of plastic products not elsewhere 
classified  3560 8 
19  Manufacture of radio, television and 
communication equipment and apparatus  3832 8 
20  Manufacture of electrical appliances and 
housewares  3833 7 
21  Manufacture of electrical apparatus and supplies 
not elsewhere classified  3839 7 
 All others    104 
 





Exports from China 
(million US. dollars) 
Intensity 
Relative to US 
US 87  54359  1.0 
EU 66  40953  1.0 
India 55  1896  18.1 
Australia 48  3570  8.4 
Argentina 43  574  46.8 
Mexico 43  1790  15.0 
Canada 21  3346  3.9 
Brazil 20  1351  9.2 
South Africa  16  1049  9.5 
Korea 14  12521  0.7 
Peru 12  177  42.4 
Turkey 12  674  11.1 
Venezuela 10  443  14.1 
New Zealand  8  435  11.5 
All Others  19     
 














United States  4 
South Korea  4 
Japan 3 
All Others  14 
    of which China  0 
 
Source: WTO official website, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm#bkmk4 
  - 32 - Table 8. Poisson regression: Effects of FDI on AD filings 
 
 
Number of obs   =  17 
LR chi2(3)      =  175.27 
Prob > chi2     =  0.0000 
Pseudo R2       =  0.5758 
Log likelihood =   -64.568 
 
  Estimate  Std.Err.   t-stat   p-value [99%  Conf.  Interval] 
FDI  0.7701904  .1495 5.15  0.000 .3848 1.155 
Exports 0.1133838  .2241  0.51  0.613  -.4639  .6907 
Ex. Rate  -.1553  .0863375 -1.80  0.072  -.3776  .0671 
Constant -1.050289 2.075  -0.51  0.613  -6.396  4.295 
     
  - 33 - Figure 1. Filing Trend Over Time 
 












# cases 11 17 10 11 11
over 100% over 50% over 30% over 10% below 10%
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